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Abstract
I construct an index of political polarization using seven previously proposed measures.
I estimate the relative propensity for polarization across demographic groups in a regression
framework and examine the extent to which demographic change can explain recent trends
in polarization. Assuming fixed propensities for polarization, I estimate that 25 to 59 per-
cent of the change in polarization between 1984 and 2016 can be attributed to demographic
change in the United States.
∗E-mail: lboxell@stanford.edu. I thank Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro for their comments and
suggestions. I acknowledge funding from the National Science Foundation (grant number: DGE-1656518) and the
Institute for Humane Studies. The American National Election Studies and the relevant funding agencies bear no
responsibility for use of the data or for interpretations or inferences based upon such uses.
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1 Introduction
The popular narrative and many academic studies suggest that the United States’ electorate is
becoming increasingly polarized. In 1994, 23 percent of Republicans were more liberal than
the median Democrat and 17 percent of Democrats were more conservative than the median
Republican based on an aggregation of ten policy questions. In 2017, only 1 percent of Re-
publicans were more liberal than the median Democrat and only 3 percent of Democrats were
more conservative than the median Republican (Kiley 2017). Favorable feelings towards the
opposing party are also at all time lows in recent years (Iyengar et al. 2012; Gentzkow 2016).
Who or what is driving contemporary US political polarization? Numerous answers have
been proposed for this question. These answers include, among others, Republicans or con-
servatives (Ornstein 2014), rising income inequality (McCarty et al. 2008), the rise in foreign
trade (Autor et al. 2016), cable television (Martin and Yurukoglu 2017), the internet and social
media (Sunstein 2017), increased ethnic diversity (Abramowitz 2014), and changing religious
beliefs (Abramowitz 2014). In this paper, I examine the extent to which demographic change
can explain recent trends in political polarization.
The United States has become increasingly educated and older in the last few decades (Ryan
and Bauman 2016; Shrestha and Heisler 2011). Both of these demographic characteristics are
highly correlated with political participation (Timpone 1998), and education is related to greater
ideological prejudice (Henry and Napier 2017). To examine the impact of these and related
demographic changes, I take seven measures used in Boxell et al. (2017), modify them so
that they can be constructed separately for demographic groups of interest, and construct an
index of polarization from these modified measures. The index of polarization increased by
35 percent between 1984 and 2016. I then use a regression framework to estimate the relative
propensities for polarization across six different demographic categories: religious affiliation,
work and income status, education, race, age, and gender. The regression framework controls
for the fact that certain demographic groups may have higher rates of polarization because their
affiliation is highly correlated with being a member of another demographic group.
This allows me to construct an estimate of the counterfactual level of polarization if propen-
sities for polarization were held constant at their 1984 levels but the demographic composition
of the United States were allowed to vary. I find that demographic change can explain 34 percent
of the change in the index of political polarization. For the individual polarization measures,
estimates range between 25 and 59 percent, with over a third of the change in partisan affect
2
being accounted for by demographic change.
This work relates to a growing literature on political polarization. Much of the previ-
ous work has focused on documenting and debating whether polarization is increasing (e.g.,
Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina et al. 2010; Lelkes 2016).
Other research examines how the different measures of political polarization are related to each
other (Mason 2015). Closest to this study is the work that examines the causes of political
polarization. Previous work has examined the role of media (Prior 2013), income inequality
(McCarty et al. 2008), international trade (Autor et al. 2016), and elite polarization (Fiorina
and Abrams 2008).
This paper also relates to work using demographic differences to examine the credibility of
proposed causes for political outcomes. Recent work use demographic differences in propen-
sities to use the internet to argue that the internet is unlikely to be driving contemporary mass
political polarization or to have altered the 2016 election outcome (Hampton and Hargittai 2016;
Boxell et al. 2017; Boxell et al. 2018). Some work has begun to look at differential polarization
rates among Republicans and Democrats and argue the answer varies based on the measure used
(Doherty 2014).
2 Data and polarization measures
The data come from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 1948–2012 Cumulative
Data file and the ANES 2016 Time Series study. The ANES studies are nationally representative
surveys that ask demographic and political questions. For consistency across years, I drop
internet-based surveys that were conducted in 2012 and 2016, thus, restricting attention to face-
to-face surveys. I also drop observations with missing or non-valid responses to any of the
demographic questions used in section 3 and restrict the data to presidential election years.
Throughout, I weight responses using the type-0, face-to-face survey weights (VCF0009x) for
respondents in 1996–2012 and the post-election, face-to-face survey weights (V160102f ) for
2016 respondents.
I use seven measures taken from Boxell et al. (2017) and modify them so that they can be
constructed at the individual respondent level.1 I first construct a measure of the ‘warmth’ of
feelings one has towards one’s own party or ideological group on a scale of 0-100 relative to the
1Boxell et al. (2017) were not the first to use these or related measures. See references therein for previous uses.
One measure from Boxell et al. (2017), issue divergence, is not used.
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opposing group. Partisan affect polarization is the difference between an individuals feelings
towards their own party and that of the opposing party. For independents, the absolute value of
the difference in feelings towards the two parties is used. I define a similar measure to measure
relative warmth of feelings for one’s own ideology using the difference between an individual’s
feelings towards their own ideological group and the opposing ideological group. Again, for
moderates, the absolute value of the difference between the two groups is used.
The next measure, partisan sorting, measures the extent to which an individual’s party and
ideological affiliations are aligned weighted by the strength of these affiliations. Similarly, I can
measure the strength of ideological beliefs. Ideological polarization is the strength of an indi-
vidual’s self-placed ideological affiliation measured from 0 to 3. Another measure examines the
extent to which respondent’s perceive there to be ideological differences between Republicans
and Democrats. Perceived partisan-ideology polarization is the difference between an individ-
ual’s placement of Republicans and Democrats on a 7-point liberal-to-conservative ideological
scale.
I also measure the extent to which individuals have consistent beliefs ideologically across
a range of six policy questions that include, among others, questions on abortion and govern-
ment defense spending.2 Issue consistency measures the extent to which an individual gives
ideologically consistent responses to a set of six policy questions. Each response is labelled
as conservative (1), moderate (0), or liberal (-1) and the absolute value of the sum of their
responses indicates an individual’s degree of ideological consistency. Finally, straight-ticket
voting is an indicator for whether an individual reported voting for the same party (Republican
or Democratic) in both the presidential and House elections.3
Given these seven measures of political polarization, I construct a single index as follows. I
normalize each of the seven measures by its standard deviation using respondents in 1984 with
non-missing values for the polarization measure. I then take the average of these normalized
measures to create an index defined at the individual level. Formally, for each individual i, I set
Mi = 1|M |
∑
m∈M
mi
σm
,
where σm is the standard deviation of the measure m across respondents in 1984. Then for each
measure (including the index), the weighted mean of the measure across respondents in year
2Relative to Boxell et al. (2017), I drop the question related to government provision of health insurance to decrease
the number of missing responses.
3See Online Appendix for the formal definition of each of these measures.
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t gives the value of the measure for a given year.4 By design, the index has been increasing
steadily since 1984 and increased 35 percent over the entire period.
3 Results
I examine differential propensities for polarization across six demographic categories: work
and income status, religious affiliation, education levels, age, gender, and race. To control
for intergroup correlations, I first estimate the following linear conditional mean model via
weighted OLS
E(M|X) = X · β, (1)
whereM is a measure of polarization and X is a vector of indicators for various demographic
characteristics5 with coefficients β.
I estimate equation (1) on two different samples: the first sample containing responses from
the 1984 and 1988 ANES surveys with estimates βˆ1984 and the second containing responses
from the 2012 and 2016 ANES surveys with estimates βˆ2016.6 For brevity, I refer to the first
sample as the 1984 sample and the second sample as the 2016 sample.
The fact that the United States has become increasingly educated and older suggests that
demographic change may be responsible for some of the recent growth in political polariza-
tion. To examine the role of demographic change, I estimate the counterfactual scenario where
propensities for polarization are fixed at their 1984 level but demographic characteristics are
allowed to vary between 1984 and 2016
M˜19842016 = X¯2016 · βˆ′1984,
where X¯2016 is the weighted average for each indicator across the 2016 sample and βˆ′1984 is
the estimates from equation (1) over the 1984 sample. Then M˜
1984
2016−M˜19841984
M˜20162016−M˜19841984
is an estimate of the
proportion of the overall change in polarization between 1984 and 2016 that can be accounted
for by demographic change.
4Note that, for the construction of the index for an individual i, the mean is taken across polarization measures
with non-missing responses. Then, separately for each polarization measure (including the index), the sample is
restricted to individuals with nonmissing responses to the polarization measure. Thus, the exact sample changes
across measures.
5See the Online Appendix for the set of demographic indicators and their construction. Of course, one indicator
for each demographic category is dropped to avoid collinearity in estimation.
6See the Online Appendix for coefficient estimates.
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Table 1 reports the estimates of this ratio for the index and each of the individual polarization
measure, along with bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals. I estimate that 34 percent
of the change in the index can be explained by demographic change. The estimates of the
individual polarization measures range from 25 percent for the measure of issue consistency to
59 percent for the measure of ideological polarization. For partisan affect, a frequently used
measure of polarization, over a third of the change can be attributed to demographic change. In
all cases, the 95 percent confidence intervals exclude demographic change explaining 0 percent
of the change in polarization.
Figure 1 uses each year separately and examines how the counterfactual level of polarization
has varied with the true predicted level of polarization between 1984 and 2016 for the index and
each individual polarization measure. Across all measures, the counterfactual level of polar-
ization has been steadily increasing upwards along with the increase in the true predicted level
of polarization. There is no clear break in either trend suggesting a relatively stable growth in
polarization induced by demographic change.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The above analysis assumes a political center and defines polarization as deviations from this
center. For some polarization measures, this choice of center is arbitrary and different choices
of “center” may give different counterfactual estimates. For other measures, such as partisan
affect, the choice of center is well-defined and thus, less subject to this critique. The fact that
the estimates for partisan affect align well with the overall index is reassuring.
The counterfactual analysis also assumes that polarization propensities across demographic
groups are fixed at their 1984 levels. However, changing demographic composition may make
certain demographic groups more or less extreme in response to perceived threats. To the ex-
tent to which demographic change increases polarization propensities, as some have suggested
(Abramowitz 2014), my estimates are conservative.
I show that demographic change may explain a nontrivial proportion of the recent rise in
political polarization. This has two immediate implications. First, there is a smaller amount of
polarization that needs to be explained by other mechanisms. Second, as demographics continue
to shift towards demographic groups with higher propensities for polarization, we should expect
the current upward trends in polarization to likewise continue.
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Figure 1: Counterfactual polarization levels
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Notes: Figure plots the the true predicted levels and counterfactual levels of polarization between 1984 and 2016 for
each polarization measure. For each year from 1984 through 2016, the plot reports the true predicted level of polar-
ization (solid) given each year’s coefficient estimates and demographic composition along with the counterfactual
level (dashed) if propensities for polarization were kept at their 1984 levels but the demographic decomposition
is allowed to vary. In contrast to table 1, each year is used separately. See main text for additional details on the
construction of each measure and the counterfactuals.
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Table 1: Impact of demographic change on polarization, 1984-2016
Measures Change in polarization due to demographic change 95% CI
Index 0.34 (0.23, 0.45)
Partisan Affect 0.34 (0.16, 0.53)
Ideological Affect 0.33 (0.13, 0.54)
Partisan Sorting 0.28 (0.08, 0.48)
Ideological 0.59 (0.17, 1.01)
Perceived Partisan-ideology 0.27 (0.18, 0.36)
Issue Consistency 0.25 (0.08, 0.43)
Straight-ticket Voting 0.31 (0.14, 0.48)
Notes: Table shows, for each measure, the estimated proportion of the change in the polarization measure that
is attributable to changes in demographics between 1984-1988 and 2012-2016 as outlined in section 3. The 95
percent confidence intervals are constructed from the standard errors of a nonparametric bootstraps of 100 repli-
cates sampled at the year level. See the Online Appendix for additional details on the nonparametric bootstrap
procedure.
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Table S1: Relative propensities for polarization, 1984
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Index Partisan Ideological Partisan Ideological Perceived Issue Straight-
Affect Affect Sorting Consist. Ticket
Intercept 1.13 1.29 0.39 1.36 1.21 0.55 1.46 1.97
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
Income: Middle 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.10
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Income: Top 0.08 -0.02 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.03 -0.08
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Gender: Males 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.08
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Race: Other -0.08 -0.33 0.14 -0.10 0.00 0.11 -0.07 -0.35
(0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14)
Race: White -0.01 -0.37 0.19 0.07 -0.03 0.23 0.05 -0.27
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Religion: Jewish -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 -0.14 0.14
(0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17)
Religion: Other 0.15 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.23 0.11 0.24 0.16
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Religion: Protestant 0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.09 0.10 -0.00 0.13 -0.05
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Education: HS or less -0.33 -0.18 -0.40 -0.41 -0.23 -0.48 -0.39 -0.15
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Education: Some college -0.16 -0.11 -0.14 -0.22 -0.18 -0.19 -0.16 -0.10
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Employment: Not in workforce 0.12 0.27 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.08 -0.05 0.19
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Employment: Unemployed 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.30
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14)
Age Group: 40-64 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.05 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Age Group: 65+ 0.12 0.06 0.25 0.14 0.00 0.18 -0.04 -0.01
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Observations 2661 2613 2276 2661 2661 2441 2637 1556
R2 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.03
Notes: Table shows the coefficients and standard errors for various weighted OLS regressions. Across all polarization measures, the sample is
restricted to observations in 1984 and 1988. Each independent variable is an indicator and the polarization measure is the dependent variable.
See main text for additional details on the construction of the polarization measure and choice of weights. See below for additional details on
the construction of the demographic indicators.
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Table S2: Relative propensities for polarization, 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Index Partisan Ideological Partisan Ideological Perceived Issue Straight-
Affect Affect Sorting Consist. Ticket
Intercept 1.19 1.46 0.54 1.27 1.12 0.91 1.18 2.22
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09)
Income: Middle 0.13 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.20 0.05
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Income: Top 0.17 0.01 0.20 0.07 0.14 0.28 0.26 0.01
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Gender: Males -0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.07 0.10 -0.00
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Race: Other -0.03 -0.41 0.10 0.11 -0.08 0.25 0.22 -0.18
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Race: White 0.08 -0.54 0.37 0.28 -0.06 0.41 0.41 -0.13
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Religion: Jewish 0.11 0.20 -0.01 0.24 0.13 0.17 0.11 -0.15
(0.10) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11)
Religion: Other -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.10 0.03 -0.11 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Religion: Protestant 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.15 -0.01 0.20 -0.05
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Education: HS or less -0.21 -0.05 -0.12 -0.26 -0.15 -0.49 -0.17 -0.04
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Education: Some college -0.15 0.03 -0.11 -0.30 -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Employment: Not in workforce 0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.02
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Employment: Unemployed 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.27 -0.11 -0.19 -0.08
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Age Group: 40-64 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.22 0.16 -0.17 -0.01 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Age Group: 65+ 0.25 0.41 0.42 0.32 0.33 -0.16 0.07 0.01
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Observations 1953 1933 1799 1953 1953 1877 1930 1139
R2 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.01
Notes: Table shows the coefficients and standard errors for various weighted OLS regressions. Across all polarization measures, the sample is
restricted to observations in 2012 and 2016. Each independent variable is an indicator and the polarization measure is the dependent variable.
See main text for additional details on the construction of the polarization measure and choice of weights. See below for additional details on
the construction of the demographic indicators.
3
1 Polarization Measure Details
Denote an individual i’s party and ideological alignment as Pi andBi, respectively, which range
from -3 (strong Democrat or liberal) to 3 (strong Republican or conservative).1 Let R = {i :
Pi > 0} denote the set of Republican respondents and define D analogously. Similarly, I let
C = {i : Bi > 0} denote the set of conservative respondents and define L analogously. The
formal definition of each of the individual polarization measures are:
1. Partisan affect for individual i is 1i∈R(ARi −ADi )+1i∈D(ADi −ARi )+1i 6∈R∪D|ADi −ARi |.
2. Ideological affect for individual i is 1i∈C(ACi −ALi )+1i∈L(ALi −ACi )+1i 6∈C∪L|ALi −ACi |.
3. Partisan sorting for individual i is (6− |Pi −Bi|)(|Pi|+ 1)(|Bi|+ 1).
4. Ideological polarization for individual i is |Bi|.
5. Perceived partisan-ideology polarization for individual i is R˜i − D˜i, where R˜i denotes
individual i’s perception on how conservative Republicans are on a 7-point liberal-to-
conservative scale and D˜i is defined analogously.
6. Issue consistency for individual i is |∑k∈K ki|, where K denotes the set of policy ques-
tions and, for each k ∈ K, ki denotes a conservative (1), moderate (0), or liberal (-1)
response to that question from respondent i.
7. Straight-ticket voting is an indicator for whether individual i reported voting for the same
party (Republican or Democratic) in both the presidential and House elections.
2 Demographic Indicator Details
I give a brief summary of the construction of the demographic indicators below. See ANES
codebooks for exact question wording and changes in wording over the years. See replication
code for exact construction.
1. Income Groups: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0114 to construct the income groups
which asks about family income before taxes and breaks it down into percentiles. The
bottom third income is the 0-33 percentile groups; the middle third income is the 34-67
percentile groups; the top third income is the 68-100 percentile groups. For the 2016 data,
I use V161361x to construct the income groups. The bottom third income is defined to
be income less than $35,000; the middle third income is defined to be income between
$35,000 and $79,999; the top third income is defined to be income greater than or equal
to $80,000.
2. Work Status: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0116 to construct the work status indica-
tors. Unemployed is defined to be those who indicate they are “temporarily laid off” or
“unemployed.” Employed is defined to be those who indicate they are “working now.”
Not in workforce is defined to be those who indicate they are “retired,” “permanently
1See main text and SI of Boxell et al. (2017) along with the ANES survey codebooks for details on the questions
used to construct each variable used in the polarization measures.
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disabled,” “homemaker,” or “student.” For the 2016 data, I use V161277 which has the
same coding as VCF0116.
3. Ideology: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0803 which asks respondents to place them-
selves on a liberal-conservative scale from 1 to 7. I define liberals as those who place
themselves as 1 or 2; moderates as those who place themselves as 3, 4, or 5; and conser-
vatives as those who place themselves as 6 or 7. For the 2016 data, I use V61126 which
has the same coding as VCF0803.
4. Party: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0301 which asks respondents whether they iden-
tify as Republican, Democratic, or Independent, and if Independent, whether they lean
towards a given party. I define the party indicators according to the responses identifying
each party and include leaners as Independents. For the 2016 data, I use V161158x which
has the same coding as VCF0301. Note that the inclusion of leaners as Independents
differs slightly from how the affect polarization measures define party affiliates.
5. Religion: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0128 which collapses previous questions re-
garding religious preferences into four categories: Protestant, Catholic (Roman Catholic),
Jewish, and Other/none. I create an indicator for each of these categories. For the 2016
data, I use V161247a and V161247b which I code the same as VCF0128.
6. Education: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0110 which asks respondents the amount of
education they’ve completed. High school or less is defined as those who complete 12
or fewer grades; some college is defined as those who complete 13 grades or more but
no college degree; college graduate is defined as those who have a college or advanced
degree. For the 2016 data, I use V161270. High school or less is defined as those who
complete 12 or fewer grades; some college is defined as those who state having some col-
lege but no degree; college graduate is defined as those who have an associates, bachelors,
masters, professional, or doctorate degree.
7. Age group: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0101. For the 2016 data, I use V161267.
8. Gender: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0104. For the 2016 data, I use V161002.
9. Race: For the pre-2016 data, I use VCF0105b which use interviewer observation of race
in early samples and respondent identification of race in later samples. I define white
as “White non-Hispanic” responses; black as “Black non-Hispanic” responses; and other
as “Hispanic” or “Other or multiple races, non-Hispanic” responses. For the 2016 data,
I use V161310x which asks respondents their racial identity. I define white as “White,
non-Hispanic” responses; black as “Black, non-Hispanic” responses; and other as “His-
panic,” “Asian, native Hawaiian, or other Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic,” “Native Amer-
ican or Alaska Native, non-Hispanic,” or “Other non-Hispanic including multiple races”
responses.
3 Bootstrap Details
To construct each bootstrap sample, I sample (separately for each year) with replacement all
observations with non-missing demographic indicators and use the polarization measures as
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constructed from the original sample. I then use these samples to construct the population-
level measure of polarization, the demographic-based changes in polarization, the difference in
demographic-based changes in polarization, and the proportion of the change in polarization
explained by demographic change. Standard errors are then computed by taking the standard
deviation of the values across the 100 bootstrap replicates.
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